Fifty years ago, India and China fought a bitter and brutal war sparked off by mutual distrust and acrimony. Today, though both countries continue to build and strengthen bilateral ties, the memory of that war still haunts the two countries .
The commemoration of 50 years of the India-China war is now upon us. On October 20 1962, China launched a two-pronged offensive in Ladakh and across the McMahon Line, overrunning Indian forces in both theatres and capturing Rezang la in Chushul in the western theatre, as well as Tawang in the eastern theatre. Then, a month later, on November 20, the Chinese declared a ceasefire and announced the withdrawal from the conflict zones.
After the war, India claimed that China was occupying about 33,000 square kilometres of its territory in the Aksai Chin region of Ladakh. China laid control over Aksai Chin, a high altitude desert, and established the current Line of Actual Control following the short border war. Despite the region being nearly uninhabitable, it remains strategically important for China as it connects Tibet and East Turkistan, China’s occupied western frontiers.
Excuses have been thrown up for the Indian military debacle. India was ill prepared; it believed in non-violence; it trusted the Chinese and in the ‘Hindi-Chini bhai bhai’ shibboleth. Fingers have been pointed, most famously at then prime minister Jawaharlal Nehru, defence minister Krishna Menon, and Lieutenant General B.N Kaul, who was in charge of the army on India’s eastern frontier. But even fifty years later, people of India are not still unaware of the circumstances and reasons that led to India’s defeat.
Successive Indian governments have refused to release the Henderson-Brooks report that investigated the lapses of 1962. The report submitted by Lt.Gen. Henderson Brooks and Brigadier P.S. Bhagat in 1963 was presented to prime minister Jawaharlal Nehru and a couple of ministers. Unfortunately, the report remains “top secret” till date. The government made a statement in Parliament on May 10, 2012 that the Report of the Operations Review Committee on the 1962 war will not be published following an order of March 19, 2009 by a Bench of the Central Information Commission as it is likely to have a security bearing on army’s operational strategy in the north-east and deployment of forces along the line of Actual Control.
According to a widespread view among many scholars of the India-China war, China wrongly believed that India was going to seize Tibet after providing political asylum to the Tibetan leader Dalai Lama. Also, India’s forward policy of building new outposts along the de facto line of control, even pushing that line forward, annoyed China immensely. According to a recently published book on the India-China war by a senior Indian Revenue Service (Customs and Central Excise) official K.N. Raghavan, India erred in unilaterally fixing her borders with China in 1954. This, along with India’s decision to give asylum to the Dalai Lama, made China suspicious of India, says the book, titled ‘Dividing Lines’.
Despite the 1962 war, the border dispute between Indian and China has proved to be a tough nut to crack. The two countries share a border that is approximately 4,000 kilometres long but border disputes continue to prevent the full normalization of relations despite almost a quarter decade of negotiations. The Sino-Indian war crystallized and enshrined the suspicions and stereotypes that each side held of the other. To this day, Beijing suspects that India, with the help of the U.S., strives to undermine its rule in Tibet in order to balance against China’s growing power.
The commemoration of 50 years of the India-China war is now upon us. On October 20 1962, China launched a two-pronged offensive in Ladakh and across the McMahon Line, overrunning Indian forces in both theatres and capturing Rezang la in Chushul in the western theatre, as well as Tawang in the eastern theatre. Then, a month later, on November 20, the Chinese declared a ceasefire and announced the withdrawal from the conflict zones.
After the war, India claimed that China was occupying about 33,000 square kilometres of its territory in the Aksai Chin region of Ladakh. China laid control over Aksai Chin, a high altitude desert, and established the current Line of Actual Control following the short border war. Despite the region being nearly uninhabitable, it remains strategically important for China as it connects Tibet and East Turkistan, China’s occupied western frontiers.
Excuses have been thrown up for the Indian military debacle. India was ill prepared; it believed in non-violence; it trusted the Chinese and in the ‘Hindi-Chini bhai bhai’ shibboleth. Fingers have been pointed, most famously at then prime minister Jawaharlal Nehru, defence minister Krishna Menon, and Lieutenant General B.N Kaul, who was in charge of the army on India’s eastern frontier. But even fifty years later, people of India are not still unaware of the circumstances and reasons that led to India’s defeat.
Successive Indian governments have refused to release the Henderson-Brooks report that investigated the lapses of 1962. The report submitted by Lt.Gen. Henderson Brooks and Brigadier P.S. Bhagat in 1963 was presented to prime minister Jawaharlal Nehru and a couple of ministers. Unfortunately, the report remains “top secret” till date. The government made a statement in Parliament on May 10, 2012 that the Report of the Operations Review Committee on the 1962 war will not be published following an order of March 19, 2009 by a Bench of the Central Information Commission as it is likely to have a security bearing on army’s operational strategy in the north-east and deployment of forces along the line of Actual Control.
According to a widespread view among many scholars of the India-China war, China wrongly believed that India was going to seize Tibet after providing political asylum to the Tibetan leader Dalai Lama. Also, India’s forward policy of building new outposts along the de facto line of control, even pushing that line forward, annoyed China immensely. According to a recently published book on the India-China war by a senior Indian Revenue Service (Customs and Central Excise) official K.N. Raghavan, India erred in unilaterally fixing her borders with China in 1954. This, along with India’s decision to give asylum to the Dalai Lama, made China suspicious of India, says the book, titled ‘Dividing Lines’.
Despite the 1962 war, the border dispute between Indian and China has proved to be a tough nut to crack. The two countries share a border that is approximately 4,000 kilometres long but border disputes continue to prevent the full normalization of relations despite almost a quarter decade of negotiations. The Sino-Indian war crystallized and enshrined the suspicions and stereotypes that each side held of the other. To this day, Beijing suspects that India, with the help of the U.S., strives to undermine its rule in Tibet in order to balance against China’s growing power.
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